ModI nt is a compact Java d ass designed for the arbit ra ry-precision modular arith metic operations used in secure cry ptogra phica l applications , including auctions and elect ronic voting. T he libr ary is sm all enough to port to a J ava-enabled cellul ar phone. In this paper, we present a new electronic voting system using th e ModInt libr ary, in which vot ers have their ballots encry pted with th e public key of a trusted agent an d cas t them to an untrusted ser ver , which tallies th em without decrypting the ballot and updates a linear-feodback shift register (LFSR) consisti ng of log n ciphe rte xts , The privacy of voters is th erefore ass ured ass uming tha t th e security of th e public-key cry pto sys te m is maintained , and the t rusted party keeps th eir private key sec ure. This feature reduces th e costs of man agement of th e count ing ser ver, which is now free from th e risks of being compro mised .
INTRODUCTION
The cellular phone is a widely used communication medium that allows us to communicate more easily and frequently than before. It has been developed to provide a number of attractive servic es to customers, including web browsing, and digital still camera and GPS (global po-sitioning system) functions. The Java application platform is also one of these new services that expands the range of application of cellular phones. The platform can offer, for example, interactive computer games, instant messaging clients, or interfaces to servers that are more intelligent and user-friendly than simple web browsers.
Electronic voting is also a prime example of a function suitable for a Java-enabled cellular phone. With a mobile voting device, one may easily participate in decision-rnaking processes whenever suitable. According to a Japanese governmental survey [4J , more than 90% of Japanese teenagers have their own cellular phone, and they are expected to be potential voters who take part in elections only if they are allowed to cast a vote from the Internet. In the near future, the population of cellular phone users will exceed that of passport holders, and hence it is possible that the cellular phone could replace the passport as a nationwide user identification scherne. Additionally, Japanese regulation has been updated in 2001 making electronic voting legal throughout Japan[13J. In June 2002, the first Japanese electronic election was held in Niimi, Okayama, in the mayoral and local assembly elections[14J. In the elections, more than 19,000 eligible voters cast their ballots from the voting machine by inserting a voting card into a voting machine, and touching the names of their preferred candidates, which appeared on a video screen. Their votes were stored in the memories of the voting machines, and counted electronically after the voting ended. The electronic voting reduces the time and effort spent on tallying vote . The total time is just 25 minutes. According to the questioner, 97 % of voters said that the machine is better than the conventional paper-based election.
The biggest issue to be resolved about real-world Internet voting is the conflict between security and privacy. In order to prevent dishonest voters and potential attackers from manipulating the tally in malicious ways -such as double voting, altering or forging ballots, and unauthorized voting -the security technologies, using public-key infrastructure with public key certificates, provide secure authentication for eligible voters. However, the identification may be used to trace the voters, and the privacy of voters may be violated by the government or the administrators of the counting server.
1'0 avoid these problems, a number of electronic voting protocols have been proposed to date. In 1997, Cramemer, Damgard and Schoenmakers presented an optimally efficient voting protocol using a homomorphic encryption, in which the size of the ballot is a single ciphertext[9J Fujioka et al. proposed an efficient protocol in [I] , combining a blind signature and anonymous channels or mix servers, and performed the experimental trial over the Internet. In 2001, Furukawa and Sako proposed a protocol to prove the correctness of shuffied ballots, and implemented it with several mix servers.
In this paper, we present a new electronic voting protocol using a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), which makes a tally using the internal state of the LFSR. In the proposed protocol, a voter shifts the public register if they wish to vote "Yes", or does nothing if they wish to vote "No". However , using a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme, no one can determine whether the vote is "Yes" or "No" by watehing the register except the trusted authority, who keeps the corresponding private key secure and reveals it to the public only when the time comes to open the tally. The communication cost for voters is of O(log n) where n is a number of voters. The idea of using an LFSR as a tally is not our own. In 2001, Katz et al. proposed cryptographic counters and constructed a concrete protocol using quadratic residue (QR) encryption in [7J. In contrast to this approach, our system adopts EI Gamal encryption that allows the decryption process to be distributed across several (incompletely trusted) authorities who hold a share of the corresponding private key in an ordinary manner.
These cryptographic approaches are substantially effective in contemporary personal computers, but the restricted computational power of cellular phones is not sufficient to perform these cryptographical computations fully. Because of restricted storage, the Biglnteger dass library, which is a Java standard dass for processing the arbitrary precision arithmetic used in cryptographical protocols, is not supported in any commercial Java-enabled cellular phone device. Moreover, the free memory capacity is 30kB at most in the NTT 504i, or lOkB in the 503i, which is too small to support the comprehensive methods in the Biglnteger dass.
In order to address the issue, we have developed a compact Java dass library named Modlnt , which is designed for the modular arithmetic used in cryptographic protocols. The Modlnt dass is -specially designed for modular arithmetic, with all operations performed implicitly in modulo, and -small enough to be ported to restricted environments such as celIular phones.
We are interested in how large overheads are generated in modular arithmetic in the cellular phone environment, and whether such arithmetic is suitable for performing electronic voting protocols. Thus, in this paper, we demonstrate the performance of the ModInt dass library and prove that the cryptographical protocol is feasible, even in an ordinary cellular phone environment. Based on the experimental results of t he library, we clarify t he necessary condit ions for lar ge-scale elect ronic voting.
T he compact J ava class librar y allows us to hold a var iety of web-b ased electronic voting including lar ge-scale election for govern ors , election for city mayor , and small-scale elect ion for student president . In t his sort of pu blic elect ion, a n election comm ittee man ages a list of eligible voters .and requires user authentication processes usin g appropriate identificat ion protocols. The simplest is a password-b ased authent ication . If we ca n ass urne t he nati onal identi ty numbering system where every citizen has ass igned number and t he X.509 public-key certificate, PKI can be used to identify t he eligible voter. According to t he "e-Japan Priority Policy Program" [12J , a PKI in Asia region is goin g to be developed by t he 2005. On August 5th 2002, J apanese government has starte d t he Basie Resident Register Network, where t he lI-digit resid ent 's cert ificate codes are ass igned to every citizen and a copy of resident 's cert ificate is available at any office around Japan. Though t here a re some concerns a bout t he protection of t he privacy, the opti on of national-wide PKI is now realistic. Any of t hese authent ication method s can be used in conj unction with t he proposed vot ing system. August 5th 2002. Basic Resident Register Network Individual info: Address, Names, Birthdays, Sex . l l-digit Regidentfs certificate code. A copy of resid entfs certificate is availa ble at any office aro und J ap an. T he concern about t he protection of pri vacy by t he government. Kokubunji , Hino, Kunitachi : pot ponement of its operation.
T he other direction of t he prop osed electronic voting system is a questionnaire-b ased use r eva luation . Web-based questionnaire have bee n used for many applications such as guest questi on naire, comme rcial pro du cts evaluation, or course evaluation. In any of questionnaire, privacy should be preserved t hough most of t hem don't take any account of t he issue. The proposed Java-based sys te m allows to any party to improve t he privacy enhance ment just repl acing t he cas t ing and the tallyin g pro cesses by the proposed system without developing from the scratch. In comparison with the public election mentioned a bove, the st rong user authentication is not always necessar y in t his sor t of quest ionnaire . Participation to evaluation is op en to a ny users and checking t he source IP address is goo d enough to prevent from malicious users from double casting .
T he st ructure of t his paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe t he protocol for oblivious vote cou nt ing with t he LFSR. Following t his, we dem onstrat e t he system design and t he performan ce of t he Modlnt Java dass library in det ail. F ina lly, we evaluate t he implem ented elect ronic voting system in terms of its complexity and communication requirements.
PRELIMINARY

Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Let M be a set of plaintexts, {mo, mt}, where mo and ml represent boolean values corresponding to 'false' and 'true', respectively. Let us suppose a homomorphic encryption scheme E that has the following properties.
-Eis homomorphic over GF (2) , i.e., far elements a and b of {mo, ml},
holds, where a E9 bis an exclusive-OR, defined as mo E9 ml = ml E9 mo = ml and mo E9 mo = ml E9 ml = mo.
-E is semantically secure, that is, no one is able to distinguish ciphertexts of mo and ml with a probability significantly greater than a random guess.
The key generation can be distributed among a certain numb er of players. The size of the public key should not depend on the number of shares.
The decryption process can be distributed among t-out-of-n players who share the corresponding private key. The computational and communication (bandwidth and rounds) costs should be as small as possible.
EI Gamal encryption satisfies all requirements under the Decision
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, if we let mo = 1 and ml = -1 (mod p) . Let p and q be large primes such that p = 2q + 1 and let 9
be the set of multiplicative groups of order q in Z;. Let (2) . A distributed decryption is also feasible. A private key is jointly generated by the collaboration oft honest parties (key holders) out of n, and distributed among them using (t - Another instance of a homomorphic encryption scheme is QR encryption, used in [7] .
Proof of Knowledge
We will use the proof of knowledge of the private input to the computer, which is based on the disjunctive and conjunctive proofs of knowledge in [10] .
Conjunctive ProofofKnowledge By PK{(a)
we denote a proof of knowledge of discrete logarithms of elements Yl and Y2 with bases gl and g2. Selecting random numbers 7'1 and r2 E Zq, a prover sends tl = gr 1 and t2 = g;Z to a verifier, who then sends back a random challenge c E {O,I}k . The prover shows 8 = r -cx (mod q), which should satisfy both 9fYI = tl and g~y~= t2·
Disjunctive Proof of Knowledge We use P K {(o, ß) : Yl = gO< V Y2 = gß} to denote a proof of knowledge of one out of the two discrete logarithms of Yl and Y2, to the base g. The prover can prove that they know a secret value under which either Y = Yl or Y = Y2 must hold, without revealing which identity was used. Without loss of generality, we assume that the prover knows a for which Y = gO< holds. The prover uniformly selects rl, 82 E Zq and C2 E {O, l}k and sends tl = gTI and t2 = gS2y~2 to the verifier, who then provides a random chaIlenge c E {O, l}k , where k is a security parameter. On receiving the chaIlenge, the prover sends 81 = rl -cla (mod q), 82, Cl and C2, where C = CI EB C2. The verifier can see if the prover is likely to have the knowledge by testing both ti = gSIy~l and t2 = gS2y~2 with provability 1 -2-k • Note that the same test can be used when ti and t2 are prepared for the other knowledge ß.
Modlnt : Compact Modular Arithmetic Java Class Library
Oblivious LFSR Protocol
An oblivious LFSR is an array of n cipher texts t hat ar e updated according to a linear irreduciblc polynomial.
An LFSR consists of n flip flops, Al ,'." An' A shift of LFSR is defined for i = 1, ... , n, by (2) where a i is of characterist ic polynomial of t-d egree An oblivious LFSR is a protocol in which a counter C communicates with 2 n voters V once each, and sends the tally (register) to an authority 5 , who decrypts it and publishes th e result. The following are the steps required for oblivious LFSR.
Step 1: (initialization) Counter C initializes a regist er
Step 2: (voting) Let b E {-I ,I} denote a " Yes" and a " No" vote, resp ectively. Voter V sends th e value to be updated to counte r C, Cl , . . . , C n , defined by
Note that when b = 1 (" No" ), t he vot er does not cha nge t he state of th e LFSR, but multiplying with t he ciph ertext of 1 makes the vote indistinguishable by a third party.
Step 3: (proof of availability) Voter and publishes B I , . . . , B n , which represent a k-th shifted pat tern when k voters cast " Yes" votes.
IMPLEMENTATION ON CELLULAR PHONES
We impl ement the ob livious LFSR protocol wit h t he NT T Docomo cellular phone series that sup ports t he J ava applications ca lled i-appli
[5].
3.1
System Design Table 1 shows t he system specificat ion of t he J ava software development toolkit [6] . In our impl ementati on, a d ient (voter) is a simple J ava applet and a server is a J ava application equ ipped with an HT TP server. Bot h t he Java ap plet and the application cons ist of seven J ava dasses, e.g., Mod Int dass for modular arithmetic integers, and EIGmal dass.
ModInt dass
ModInt is a compact J ava dass designed for arb it ra ry precision modular arit hmetic operations. In orde r to reduce t he size of t he librar y, it om its t he following functions su pported in t he BigIn teger dass.
-bit manipulation (AND, OR, NOT) , -a sign digit , -a hexadecimal representation for input and output, -pri me numb er generation (which may be per for med off-line by a more powerful computer).
T he Modlnt dass prov ides t he fund am ent al 15 methods in 6 kB of bytecode. In the Modlnt dass, a value is an object implicitly bound to a modulo p and is computed in (mod n). In order to distinguish Modlnt from Bitlnteger, let us consider an example of part of the EIGamal encryption algorithrn, defined by c = myT modp.
If this is executcd in BigInteger, after instantiating four objects, m, y, r and p, we must write explicitly c=m.multiply(y.modPow(r, p)).mod(p) , where two modular commutations are performed, incurring an overhead when c is extended to size 2p, and then is reduced to size p. In ModInt, we simply write c=m.multiply(y.Pow(r))
where modulo p is implicitly computed. A more complete source is shown in Figure 1 . We illustrate the difference between Biglnteger and Modlnt in Table 2, and show some fundamental Java constructors and methods in Table 3 and 4, resp ectively. Retu rns an instance of this + b
Returns a n instance of this x b
Returns an instance of this « 32 
EVALUATION
We evaluated OUf system on two platforms: an i-appli emulator and a comme rcially-available cellular phone (the NTT Docomo D503is) .
4.1
Performance in the J2ME Emulator Table 5 shows an environment running the i-appli emu lator.
In Table 6 and 7, we show the performan ce of OUf system in t he i-app li emulator for J2 ME , where Key, Ca rry, Enc an d Shift are t he processing t imes for reading t he pub lic key, reading the register, comput ing reencrypt ion, shift ing the LFSR, an d sending votes, resp ecti vely. The Ipl represents t he size of p in bits. We show t he pro cessing t ime varying with t he size of P for n = 3 in Tabl e 6, and n in Ipl = 512 in Table 7 .
From t he t ables, we notice t hat the perform an ce bottleneck is within t he cry ptographical pro cesses rat her t han t he file input-output pro cesses . At most , t he encry ption takes more t han 80% of t he tot al time.
Performance in the Docomo D503is
We demonstrated t he implemented system on t he NT T Docomo D503is (see F igure 2). T he perfor mance of t he D 50:~is is reported in Table 8 and 9 and in F igure 3 and 4. The value Ipl = 512 is used for t his syste m.
Based on t he exp erimental perform an ce, we observe t hat t he ti me for processing dep ends on n and Ipl. It should be not ed t hat t he D503is takes about 23 longer t han t he pe emulator does, as power consumption concerns limit t he computational power of cellular pho nes in mobile environme nts.
Pre-computation to Reduce Processing Time
According to t he experimental results, we can est imate an average processing time for any given parameter. For example, if Ipl = 512 and Figure 2 . A screenshot of the implemented system there are 0.1 million voters, then by calculating n = log2 100,000 = 17, we expect about 37 minutes per voter, which is not realistic. Hence, we try to reduce the number of cryptographical processes. Recalling the updating formula Table 7 , we show th e expec ted reduction in time in Tabl e 10, which demonstrat es t hat the high est reduction is about 22 %.
.Sealability of the Proposed System
We est imate th e scalability of th e proposed syst em based on the experimental processing time. Let us assume th at the maximum waiting t ime is 30 seconds. We may then est imate how many powerful computers would be required when elect ions ar e conducted at several scales, ranging from 32 vot ers for a tiny dass president elect ion to a 300 million-scale election for govern ors. Table 11 illustrates t he estimat ion. It shows that computation time can be reduced by about 22%. If we hold a 1000-scal e election, we need a Java processor in the cellular phone that is 10.1 times faster. 
Comparison to the Conventional System [1]
In [1J, an eleetronic vot ing system is rep or ted. The system uses a blind signat ure with mix servers for preserving t he privacy of voters , the Schnorr signat ure for t he ad ministrator, threshold EI Gam al encry pt ion for t he public key cry ptosystem, and hybrid mix networks cornbining t he Diffie-Hellman and t he DES algorit hms for shuffii ng t he votcs.
The largest difference to our system is t he ex istence of an anonymous channel, such as mix and shuffie. In our system, t he anonymo us channel is not required , bu t a greater computat ional cost is needed for updating regist ers.
We summarize t he compariso n in Table 12 , where t he performan ce with 10 users is evaluated on a Pentium II 400 MHz and t he digital signat ure pro cesses ar e omitted in [1 J. The performan ce in our syste m is est ima ted from Tabl e 4.
In conclusion, by removing t he t ime-consuming process of mixing, which t akes a time prop or tional to the number of vote rs , we reduce t he processing time at t he server. T he cost is depend ent on th e number of registers, which is t he log of t he number of voters .
In compa rison to t he elect ronic vot ing in Niimi city, our system does not require any special devices such as t he vot ing machine an d t he voting card . The cellular ph one is a versatile tool and henc e it is better choice as the voting devic e. Moreover, t he black-box machine cannot convince 
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x .·· [ms] people that the tallying has been performed correctly and the privacy of voting is preserved. The every step in our system is publicly verifiable to any party who wish to verify the accountability.
Performance of the ModInt Library
The performance advantage of the ModInt library, compared to the BigInteger library, is due to improvements to the multiplication of a few integers at once. For instance, letting a, band c be 1024-bit Biglntegers, we write a.multiply(b).multiply(c).mod(p), whose size is expanded up to 3072 bits once, before being reduced back to 1024 bits. The Modlnt, in contrast, constantly maintains a size of 1024 bits. In general, the processing time with respect to the number of multiplications t is shown in Figure 5 .
The result shows that the ModInt achieves better performance than BigInteger when t is greater than 6, although t is limited to less than 3 in the EI Gamal encryption in our system.
5.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient cryptographic protocol for aseeure electronic voting system and have shown that the proposed protocol is feasible for a Java-enabled cellular phone platform with limited computing power . From the experimental results, we determined that a cellular phone processor 22 times faster than those currently available is required to hold a 3 million voter election, and that pre-computation helps by saving 22% of the processing time. Our implemented Modlnt Java dass library is specially designed for modular arithmetic and provides better performance than Biglnteger.
